experience as a resource for moral reflection. Doms no doubt gave expression to currents of philosophical thought which had become gradually more prevalent and were ripe for application in Roman Catholic sexual theory. Personalism is a characteristically modern phenomenon in that it stresses the priority of the human subject. Hence it construes sexuality's meaning in terms of a range of values, especially intersubjective ones. Although the marital relationship includes the births and education of children, the personal relationship of spouses overshadows the contributions of fertility to family and species. The introduction of personalist themes has precipitated a basic shift in the way the priority of the traditional purposes of sexual acts (procreation and unity) is understood, a shift with effects still to be realized. Although the language even of Casti connubii (1930) granted that love, as a "mutual and intimate harmony," is "the elemental cause and reason for matrimony," 3 that encyclical still ranked procreation and mutual help as primary and secondary ends, both of marriage and of sexual acts. 4 By the time of Vatican II (1965) these two purposes are mentioned equally, as requiring harmonization: "conjugal love" and "the responsible transmission of life." 5 Humanae vitae (1968) follows Gaudium et spes by abandoning hierarchical language regarding the meanings of "the conjugal act" (the "unitive" and "procreative" ), but by stipulating their "inseparable connection" in each and every sexual act, still manages to retain the ban on artificial contraception originally formulated within the view exalting procreation.
7
Subsequent teaching on sexuality, especially of the present pope, has attended increasingly to the personalist foundations of sexual obligations. Yet practical conclusions once yielded by the hierarchy of ends are defended even within this expanded understanding. 8 Except that many writings with personalist foundations and traditionalist conclusions advert explicitly to continuity with past teaching and church authority, 9 it would be remarkable that so significant a shift in foundations has not yielded parallel practical consequences. A similar inconsistency exists in the Code of Canon Law, particularly in light of the revisions undertaken in the wake of the Council. The 1983 Code reflects personalist values. It replaces the 1917 Code's definition of marriage as a contract in which is exchanged the right over one another's body with a view to the acts apt for procreation (ius in corpus), with a combination of covenant and contract language, and indicates that that to which the partners consent is the partnership of the whole of life (communio). One notes, however, that the conclusions about sacramental marriage, indissolubility, and divorce, once undergirded by the obsolete contract definition, remain in place alongside the less congenial covenant and partnership language. 10 These inconsistencies notwithstanding, Catholic thinking about sexuality is on a trajectory toward appreciation of the interpersonal dimension as primary, with procreation in a secondary place. An important future question is how to recognize the importance of fertility and the nurturing of children without limiting the roles of women to motherhood or tying sexuality's meaning too closely to its biological dimensions. Wider concerns are the institutionalization of sexuality in marriage and family, and the morality of sexual activity beyond these institutions. 
13
But how faithful was this approach to the experience of married couples? This challenge was presented by a few Continental theologians influenced by phenomenological philosophy, notably Dietrich von Hildebrand 14 and Herbert Doms. 15 Although von Hildebrand reacted against an overemphasis on procreation, he conceded that it is the primary purpose of marriage, though not its primary meaning, and clearly affirmed the validity of the teaching of Casti connubii on contraception. This, no doubt, was what was to save his work from the fate that met Doms's book, which the Congregation of the Holy Office ordered withdrawn from publication in the early 1940s. 16 According to von Hildebrand, the love which gives marriage its primary meaning is a complete and exclusive self-offering or self-surrender of each spouse to the other. 17 Although the experienced married couple might inquire whether any human love ever reaches that pinnacle of complete and total self-gift, von Hildebrand's work was a necessary corrective to an approach to marital sexuality which dislocated the moral analysis of sexual intercourse from its context in the lifelong relationship of the couple. Doms, whose work was to have more influence in the English-speaking world despite the Vatican intervention, sees marriage's meaning in the "twoin-oneship" or community of life of the couple. This two-in-oneship includes both love and sexual acts expressing love and leading to procreation.
18
Of Aquinas' hypothesis that God must have united woman to man to help him only in the work of generation, Doms remarks: "One cannot 12 Recognized as legitimate by Casti connubii 25. 13 20 According to Doms, experience shows that sexual intercourse in marriage functions first of all as an expression of mutual love and a sharing of lives, an act of which a child can be the "natural fruit." Nevertheless, even though the child "enlarges the marriage community and turns it into a family," it "does not alter it in any essential way" nor fulfil the potential of the woman more than that of the man.
21
Consequently, it only makes sense to speak of the "one immediate purpose" of the sexual act as "the representation and realisation by husband and wife of their state of two-in-oneship."
22 This oneness should be the primary motive for which women and men marry, and is generally the dominant intention in their sexual relations. Doms finally recommends that primary and secondary terminology regarding marriage's "procreative and personal purposes" be abandoned altogether and that both be subordinated to marriage's meaning. 23 A decree of the Holy Office, issued April 1, 1944, which names no names, nevertheless condemns "certain modern writers" who "either deny that the primary end of marriage is the generation and education of children, or teach that the secondary ends are not essentially subordinate to the primary end, but are equally principal and independent."
24
The suggestions of Doms drew fire from fellow moralists as well. In his first article in Theological Studies, John Ford called Doms's book important but "provocative."
25 Ford argued to the contrary that the essence of marriage must be some minimum "without which marriage cannot exist," 26 implying that "two-in-oneship" not only exceeds what is necessary but also neglects a more basic and independent variable, the indissoluble bond created by the marital consent of the couple. The personalist definition fails to usurp the juridical one, tied to canon law. Ford reaffirms the three canonical "ends" of marriage-"procreation and education of offspring, remedy for concupiscence, mutual help"
27
-and interprets the third as implying a "life-partnership" much resembling Dom's "two-in-oneship."
28 Nevertheless, the actual realization of these ends is not essential to any given marriage. "Even a marriage in which there is no mutual help, no life in common, hatred instead of love, and complete separation, both bodily and spiritually, remains a true marriage in the sense that the essence of marriage is still there "
29
This essence is a bond consisting of rights and duties in regard to the acts by which the ends of marriage are to be realized. Ford acknowledges that canonists have said next to nothing about the rights and duties of mutual help, a failing which has led to the personalist reinterpretations.
30
On the one hand, Ford is sympathetic: "It seems to be an affront to common sense to tell the world of married people: You think that marriage consists in a life-partnership of which the marriage act is only one part, and perhaps not always the most important; but the truth is that the relation of marriage to the marriage act is the only essential thing in it " 31 On the other hand, the traditional paradigm scores its victory over "common sense": "The actual virtue of conjugal love is not essential to marriage. In thousands of marriages we find no trace of it; yet they are real marriages." 32 According to Ford, it is "unthinkable" that Casti connubii could amount to the suggestion that the traditional end of marriage and the marriage act be relegated to a lesser status, and suggests that Pius XI must have meant to refer to love as a motive for marriage, rather than as an objective and essential end.
33
Over 20 years later, Ford's colleague Gerald Kelly joined this critique in their manual Contemporary Moral Theology, an entire volume of which was devoted to marriage. 34 In the space of two decades, personalist language had made considerable inroads. Ford and Kelly state it as their purpose to "vindicate" "the personalist (secondary) ends of marriage," giving them "the essential place they deserve, while at the same time defending their essential subordination to the primary ends."
35 They insist even more clearly on the right of each spouse to acts conducive to these secondary ends. Yet, in the questions of concrete morality with which the book's second half is concerned, we find an incongruous and even droll combination of old-fashioned hairsplitting and the newer experience-sensitive practicality. One is relieved to reach the end of a two-page discussion of just how far the penis must penetrate into the vagina to constitute a complete sexual act (answer: 1/3), and even more so to find finally the opinion that in any event the practice of copula dimidiata (partial penetration to reduce probability of conception) would not be wrong if there were "proportionate reasons" to avoid more children. 36 Reading at least some of the signs of the times, the authors note that "modern theologians" recognize that sexual pleasure is legitimate and valuable in itself. 37 They conclude a technically-phrased discussion of whether multiple female orgasms in one act of intercourse are immoral because each alone is an "incomplete" sexual act, by appealing to "a strong presumption from common sense" to the contrary and conceding that the whole issue "is academic rather than real." 38 Although they note that "oral-genital contacts" may be "repugnant and shocking" to some, they assert that culture and education enter into such responses and that a moral judgment should not rest on "emotional reactions" or aesthetics.
39
On matters such as these, in which official proclamations are lacking or inconclusive, the authors can be flexible. On questions on which past magisterial teaching and hence credibility already have been hung, experiential and personalist values will have much less influence. "The Catholic Church teaches that contraception is intrinsically and gravely immoral and that no reason whatsoever can justify it." Thus "there can be no substantial change in that teaching." 42 Given the then standard premise that all directly willed sexual pleasure outside of marital intercourse is mortally sinful, the clarification of the conditions of such sin was no light matter either. The most popular subjects of the day were a variety of types of and motives for birth control, especially sterilization. Subcategories of the topic included therapeutic double vasectomy, removal of the uterus during a caesarean section, amplexus reservatus (intercourse without ejaculation), co-operation of one spouse in the other's birth control, adequate reason for the use of rhythm and whether it could be continued indefinitely, and, as the anovulant pill was developed, whether it could be used to suppress ovulation to ensure infertility during lactation or to regularize the menstrual cycle and so guarantee reliable prediction of the infertile period.
43
Significant attention was devoted to the pastoral prudence of the confessor, 44 indicating the moralist's awareness that eventually the clear rule must meet the cloudy situation and that the pastor must be equipped to meet the urgent personal needs of those whom sacramental practice had made dependent on him. Nevertheless, one reads literature of this period with a crowding awareness that conservation of the procreative effect of sexual intercourse within marriage was the dominant interest of theologians addressing sexual morality. Under very few circumstances was the spiritual, psychological, and social welfare of spouses allowed to override their duty to procreate, or at least to conduct themselves in such a way when seeking sexual union that procreation might well occur. Moreover, regard for a woman's life or health is subordinated to procreation's primary place in marriage and in marital sexuality. The sexual situations of persons outside marriage receive scant attention, 45 excepting determinations of the canonical conditions of such persons' entry into or exclusion from the married state. marital sexuality, and precipitated a more fundamental discussion of whether it is morally necessary to confine sexual expression to marriage. The contraception debate also exposed fundamental problems in the basic method of Roman Catholic natural-law ethics. What precisely is human sexual nature, and how is that to be determined? To what extent must an "objective" understanding of human sexuality and the moral bonds contingent upon it be grounded in the concrete, variable, and to some degree ambiguous sexual experiences of determinate persons? What is the relation between personal experience and the social expectations and institutions which mediate that experience?
The discussion of oral contraceptives in scholarly theological publications began in 1957-58, allowing their use for therapeutic reasons only, i.e. when the intention behind their use is not to prevent ovulation as such, but to regulate the menstrual cycle. 47 This limitation was reinforced by a discourse of Pius XII. 48 Couples were urged to use self-restraint and abstinence from sexual relations when circumstances demanded that family size be controlled. 49 Commenting on the first few years of the discussion, John Lynch was able to say in 1962 that "moralists have never been less than unanimous" in condemning the use of the pill for contraceptive purposes. 50 But even the most strenuous arguments against contraception were appealing to personal, relational values, not resting their case exclusively on the physical integrity of the act or on the idea that the generative faculty is directed toward the good of the species, not that of the individual. To fit constant readiness (if not willingness) for procreation into a personalist understanding of marriage, it was virtually necessary to define the woman's part in the spousal union in terms of domesticity, motherhood, and allied "feminine" traits. Paul M. Quay, vehement but not unrepresentative, advanced the view that "each single act of coition is a natural sign of the full, mutual, procreative love of the two partners," and that contraception substitutes a sign of "monstrous 47 selfishness." 51 The man who uses a condom "worships" his wife "with his body-but not enough to share with her his substance." In turn, "The woman who uses a diaphragm has closed herself to her husband. She has accepted his affection but not his substance. She permits him entrance but does not suffer him to be master." Thus sex as the "sign and symbol of wifely submission, of patriarchal authority, is made over covertly to serve the purposes of a weakly uxorious male and a domineeringly feminist wife."
52
In 1961 the situation of religious missionary sisters thought to be in danger of rape in politically unstable circumstances in the Congo gave new direction to the ongoing discussion of contraceptive drugs. This "test case" turned attention away from the context of marriage, concentrating instead on the autonomy and welfare of women threatened with sexual violence. Would it be justifiable to use such drugs with a directly sterilizing intention, at least as part of an effort of legitimate self-protection?
53
Three Roman moral theologians (P. Palazzini, F. Hürth, F. Lambruschini) made a generally favorable argument, particularly since the woman is potentially an unwilling participant in an act which has no capacity to be an expression of love or to be part of a relationship suited to the birth of a child. 54 These essays provoked a debate in which others responded with the more traditional view that the pre-emptive defense would be an intrinsically evil action, because it is a direct interference with the natural reproductive function. 55 But the proposal continued to have defenders.
56
Some even extended the principle of legitimate self-defense to the case of a married woman who is pressured by her husband to engage in intercourse when conception would be a likely as well as disastrous outcome. The significance of these exchanges lies not in any explicit development of traditional teaching toward arguments favoring artificial birth control. The fact that intercourse is an act of aggression would be inconsequential within the standard framework, for the perpetration of an immoral act by a first agent would not justify a second agent's defense against that act by any means which in itself is morally objectionable. A favorable reply to the question would rely logically on the presupposition that acts which interfere deliberately in the procreative outcome of sexual intercourse do not possess a moral character independently of circumstances in which both the sex act and procreation can be viewed in relation to the persons who undertake or are affected by them. But this line of argument was not one which the authors of 1961 were prepared to adopt explicitly. The debate was important, instead, because it presented the possibilities that practical problems could challenge the accustomed ways of thinking about contraception, and because it joined respected theological voices in a reexamination of the prohibition on it-although it is revealing of racial attitudes that these particular circumstances were required to raise the question in the European mind. The debate was one of several movements in the Church which together, at the time of Vatican II, were to sponsor a hope among both theologians and laypersons that the traditional strictures on control of conception would be revised. This concern with the consequences of a change in teaching-especially the fear that immediate consequences may gather momentum and produce a social scenario qualitatively different and intolerably worse-is typical of many attempts to defend the tradition on this point. The negative consequences of a retraction of the ban on contraception are perceived to be dangerous both for the credibility of the magisterium and for sexual practice. Retrospectively, it seems possible that Humanae vitae precipitated the very consequences it aimed to deter: first, by undermining the perception of many church members that the magisterium fully appreciates not only the value but also the complexity and difficulty of sustaining responsible sexual, marital, and parental relationships; and second, by missing an opportunity to offer the sort of prudent and charitable counsel which could encourage the efforts of Christian adults to transcend modern distortions of sexual meaning and achieve a mutual commitment which can also nurture children.
In any event, it is significant that the traditional defense, mounted on the notion of the "intrinsic evil" of acts considered in themselves and apart from situational idiosyncrasies, is from another perspective quite concerned, in determining valid teaching, with the importance of social context and of projected effects on persons and communities. This point is noted not to suggest cynically that magisterial teaching and revisionist parries are equally "relative" to circumstance or politically motivated, but rather to highlight the fact that historical location is the very condition of possibility of normative thinking, necessary both to the framing of questions and to the formulation of answers. 68 The personalist movement in Catholic sexual ethics instantiates a critical awareness of this fact, insofar as personalism turns attention to the experience of spouses in all its cultural and social variability. 69 At the same time, there was in early personalist thought, as well as in subsequent adaptations of it by the magisterium, a tendency to construe "the" experience of marital sexuality as an invariant thing, a reification which the turn to experience itself already had begun to undermine. The further implications of this turn, in terms of a critical approach to sexual norms, were to be felt more completely after Humanae vitae.
Of course, the growing realization that Roman Catholic sexual teaching has a history and a context is not merely a consequence of the encyclical; it had been a crucial contributing factor to the Church's perception that birth control needed to be addressed again, and possibly reconsidered thoroughly. The atmosphere of the early 60s and most of the parameters of the discussion since can be captured by a comparison of two opposite books, each by an author notable both for intellectual acumen and for willingness to rise to the occasion of the Church's defense. These are John Noonan's Contraception, 10 and Germain Grisez's Contraception and 78 These shifts seem to prepare the way for a redrawing of the line delineating restrictions on birth control.
Objections which could be leveled against Noonan by those who are more conservative are that, whatever the historical circumstances, the Church has always in some way excluded direct interference in conception; and that, even if this consistency alone is not enough to make the teaching irreversible, the authority oí Humarme vitae should conclusively terminate the probings Noonan had suggested. The appendix of Noonan's second edition seems to grant the latter argument. He there notes that Humanae vitae develops teaching by considering love on a par with procreation and by encouraging responsible control of birth, but he accepts it as at least a provisional close to discussion of contraception's permissibility. A final criticism-this time from those whose sympathies remain with the original study-might concern the consistency of the new conclusion with the historical review, which implied that Humanae vitae could be situated along on a continuum of evolution and restatement.
Germain Grisez, on the other hand, urged prior to Humanae vitae that, were the Church to set aside the ideal by which procreation and union "together and inseparably govern each sexual embrace," she would "surrender to Freud and Kinsey," with the result of "making herself absurd and invalidating her own claims to holiness." 79 Grisez defends the thesis that "For one who engages in sexual intercourse directly to will any positive deed by which conception is thought to be prevented, or even rendered less probable, is intrinsically and seriously immoral." 80 But the customary "natural law" defenses marshaled in favor of this thesis have been inadequate. Certainly it is not always wrong to prevent a physical faculty from attaining its end; procreation is not an absolute good or duty; and even if procreation is a contribution to the common good, the duty to make this contribution has limits (or else no method of birth control would be licit). 81 "conventional natural-law theory," which mistakenly tries to ground objective moral norms on purely speculative knowledge, and assigns an unduly limited role to practical reason; 82 and of a "situationist" revision of natural-law theory, which is dualistic toward the agent's intention and outward behavior, making "the preferred value" the "psychic, subjective, personal or interpersonal" one. 83 Grisez proposes a more adequate theory, grounded in Aquinas, and allowing a significant place for empirical inquiry in determining the basic goods which, revealed in experience, also become the principles which guide practical reason. 84 In a paraphrase and expansion of Aquinas, 85 Grisez summarizes the basic human incli nations and hence goods:
.. .the tendency to preserve life, especially by food-seeking and by self-defensive behavior; the tendency to mate and to raise his children; the tendency to seek certain experiences which are enjoyed for their own sake; the tendency to develop skills and to exercise them in play and the fine arts; the tendency to explore and to question; the tendency to seek out the company of other men and to try to gain their approval; the tendency to try to establish good relationships with unknown higher powers; and the tendency to use intelligence in guiding action.
86
Immorality consists in acting directly against any of these equally basic goods, even for the sake of another on the list. Contraception differs from periodic continence since it is a direct act against the good of procreation, and hence an assault on a fundamental and inviolable human good.
87
At least two questions may be raised against Grisez's position. First, are these goods actually all equally basic, and basic in the same way, as he insists? Aquinas does not go so far as to assert that they are, and in fact distinguishes them by levels of human nature, which has inclinations in common with all animate creatures, with other animals, and as having some humanly unique qualities. Do experience, tradition, and Scripture bear out the idea that procreation is on a par with life, or that life is on a par with our relationship to God? Second, why is contraception (espe cially within an otherwise procreative marriage) genuinely an act "against" the good of procreation, rather than a deferment of it to a more appropriate time? The definition of a contraceptive act as an act violating the procreative good seems to require that the significance of each act of intercourse be defined as an isolated event, rather than in relation to a 82 continuum of events within a sexual, personal, and social relationship.vitae, focuses on the places of sexuality and parenthood within the marital relationship. It is quite traditional in continuing to see marriage as the sole appropriate context for sexual expression, but tries to maneuver the Church's affirmation of the ends of marriage away from single acts of sexual intercourse, united only as a consecutive series of single events, each of which is burdened to sum up all that a marriage is. Procreation is "a specific task of marriage" but must be seen in the "totality" of the marital community, which has sexuality as its unifying force. "If an arbitrarily contraceptive mentality is to be condemned, as has always been the Church's view, an intervention to regulate conception in a spirit of true, reasonable and generous charity (cf. Matt. 7.12; John 13.34-5; 15.12-17; Rom. 13.8-10) does not deserve to be, because if it were, other goods of marriage might be endangered."
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The arguments distilled in the majority's report were convincing to many committed to a renewed understanding of sex within a broadly Catholic context. 92 Richard McCormick acknowledged that while church teaching has evolved by seeing love as an integral meaning of intercourse, he was no longer persuaded that love and procreation are so linked in every act that "one who deliberately renders coitus sterile attacks its meaning as an expression of mutual self-giving." 93 Appealing to Vatican II's criterion of "the nature of the persons and his acts," 94 he insisted that "the basic criterion of the meaning of human actions is the human person, not some isolated aspect of the person." 95 The encyclical did not rebut effectively the counterargument of the "Majority Report." Although a theologian could concede "that the teaching is clear and certain simply because the papal magisterium has said so," to do so would imply the unacceptable "supposition that the clarity and certainty of a conclusion of natural-law morality are independent of objective evidence." incongruities in the tangle of various theories of sex and birth control with the experience of the committed couple. A mistake often made by the celibate, she said, is to presume that his own experiences of cultivating sexual self-control and asceticism can be transferred to wives and husbands. 97 What he fails to understand is that a spouse "has sublimated the sexual drive into a relationship with another person," 98 the demands of which are "real and meaningful demands." The relational use will necessarily be "far more frequent" than its procreational. "Thus in actual practice man has no real choice ... but to find some method of birth control which allows him to continue to use the sexual act for its relational purpose and to do this under as ideal emotional circumstances as possible." air of erotically-mystical lyricism," Riceour urged that, after Freud, we have learned that "sexuality is not simple, and that the integration of its multiple components is an unending task." 101 Ricoeur describes sex as a language which can express tenderness, as long as it is kept in balance with eroticism, the cultivation of pleasure. A "wager" of our culture is that the institution of marriage is the best chance for tenderness in sexuality, for the "duration and intimacy of the sexual bond."
102 Contraception carries the risk of making the sexual act facile and insignificant. The task of tomorrow's sexual ethics is to preserve sexuality's value as a union of the spiritual and carnal aspects of the person, and as a vehicle of tenderness. The analogy of sexuality to language captures its interpersonal expressiveness and has been important in furthering subsequent experience-based phénoménologies of sexuality. An influential elaboration of this analogy is André Guindon's The Sexual Language. 103 Drawing especially on psychological theories of human sexual development, he discerns an intrinsic communicative character of sex, and assigns pleasure a positive role in its moral and theological interpretation. 104 Coition is a "language of totality" and is immoral in the absence of proportionate commitment. 105 Prescriptive norms must be inferred from experience and confirmed in social consensus.
Although not all authors address them directly, a crucial set of practical questions concerns the precise content and limits of the relational and procreative meanings of sex. If a normative meaning of sex is relationship, intimacy, or love, does that require that sexual expression be appropriate only in a fully committed relationship (marriage or its practical equivalent 106 )? If a normative meaning of sex is procreation, parenthood, or fecundity, does that require that procreation be a part of every sexual relationship, except in the case of infertile persons? Finally, are these two meanings intrinsically interdependent, so that the relational signif-icance of a sexual relationship is itself incomplete without procreation, and conversely, so that responsible procreation can take place nowhere but in a committed love relationship with one's procreative partner?
To liken sexuality to a language does not resolve these questions, since it leaves open the standards of "truthfulness" or objectivity which sexual communication must meet. Roman Catholic authors typically are concerned about fidelity to the traditional vocabulary (the twin purposes of sex affirmed by Gaudium et spes and Humanae vitae), although they are not always equally supportive of the standard practical applications (reiterated, e.g., by the 1975 Vatican Declaration 107 ). They tend to rewrite practical moral guidelines by redefining procreation and union as "natural" meanings of sexuality-rather than by turning to another resource, e.g. Scripture (though that may be included).
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A fairly drastic and hence instructive renovative effort is the study commissioned about ten years after Humanae vitae by the Catholic Theological Society of America, Human Sexuality.
109 Upon publication, it was hailed and assaulted with about equal frequency and enthusiasm. While retaining the language of sex's double purpose, this study employs historical, biblical, and social-scientific tools to cut that language to a more inclusive model of sexual morality. Although a rigorous methodology for integrating these resources is not achieved, the authors succeed in presenting forcefully the question whether past church teaching can meet the tests of external criteria. The study's major constructive proposal is a translation of "procreation and union" into "creativity and integration." How the latter might function as criteria for acts is specified in terms of seven values of human sexuality. The creative and integrative sexual act will be self-liberating, other-enriching, honest, faithful, socially fecundity. In one way such an approach may seem to offer too few practical standards, but in another it is almost certainly too demanding. "Fecundity," expanded to cover virtually all the qualities which make human existence secure, hopeful, and creative, may force the sexual dimension of experience-important but not all-encompassing-to bear more than its share of human meaning.
human sexual embodiment, recognize that broad and deep human experiences or inclinations can serve as the basis of value judgments (the key premise of the natural-law tradition), and attempt to reach persons whose experience does not match the norm, tailoring the general rule to accommodate divergent realities.
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While recent revisionist authors are clear that the sheer biological structure of sexual intercourse is inadequate as a moral norm, they still face the task of bringing the values and moral mandates demanded by the intersubjective dimensions of sexuality back into significant relationship with the embodied nature of the subject. 121 Have traditionalist authors been more successful in relating these two poles convincingly?
John Paul II and the "Language of the Body" John Paul II has been particularly energetic in pursuing personalist as well as biblical values, using the metaphor "language of the body" to play out sexuality's intersubjectivity. 122 The pope suggests that Adam's excla- 123 Moreover, the "finality" of "the life of the spousesparents" is to make their "humanity" "subject in a way" to "the blessing of fertility, namely, procreation' (Gen 1:28)."
124 Leaving aside the question whether or how these theological interpretations are linked to the original meanings of the biblical texts, one can still appreciate John Paul II's attempt to engage Catholic sexual morality with Scripture and to explore basic male-female relationships. Woman and man are addressed in egalitarian terms as able in and through their sexuality to experience mutual self-donation, a personal relationship which opens onto the ideal of Christian self-offering love.
Yet questions follow. On exactly what basis (other than tradition) is it affirmed that the marital experience requires procreation as the completion of conjugal love (especially if tied to each sex act)? Has the experience of married persons been consulted adequately to confirm such an assertion? 125 Second, are the ideals of unity and mutual self-donation really conceived equally for men and women? The ideals are presented with little attention to the social conditions which would make true reciprocity in sexuality, marriage, and parenthood a genuine possibility. The "mutual self-gift" language must be placed against the backdrop of gender roles, especially the pre-eminence of motherhood for women, which clearly color the picture John Paul II paints of sexual fulfilment in marriage. 126 One commends the pope for speaking out against injustice to women 127 and giving attention to biblical evidence for the equality of women and for the sinfulness of their subordination to men. 128 Yet the practical consequences of biblical and personalist themes are far from receiving full recognition. One is struck by the coalescence of a sexual ethics of procreation and union represented in each and every sexual act, and a social context in which motherhood must constitute the primary identity of sexually active women.
One suspects that, were it not for a "bottom line" of consistency with Humanae vitae, 129 these personalist insights would lead ineluctably to the conclusions that, if mutual "self-gift" is to be the most basic norm of the male-female relationship, then (1) interpersonal values are the essence of marriage, to which sex and procreation are linked in firm but subordinate relationships; (2) full interpersonal and sexual reciprocity of women and men implies equality in all spheres of familial and social life; (3) full equality in family, church, and society likewise implies the necessity to control reproduction adequately to permit women as well as men to mesh family life with their contributions in other spheres. As a final point, the elevated self-gift language of papal writings romanticizes sexual commitment. Romanticism militates against success in meeting the more practical demands of sexual, marital, and family life, and when aligned with an "authoritative" overemphasis on procreation, can conscript married persons' positive experiences of sexuality into the service of extrinsic evaluative standards rejecting any compromise of the ideal as "selfish." In failing to make any significant distinction between homologous and heterologous methods of conception, the magisterial teaching document misses another opportunity to offer prudent and reliable guidance to Catholics and others in a culture which makes any conjunction among sex, commitment, and procreation virtually dependent on free choice. The Vatican fails to elucidate what reasonable relationship might actually be affirmed between love and procreation, once the act-focus is overcome. This shortcoming feeds into the revisionist personalists' difficulty in incorporating the physical experiences of sex and parenthood into the normative meaning of sex as important even if not controlling. One illustration is an essay of Louis Janssens, who, having established a "personalist foundation" for sexual responsibility and recognized the corporeality and sociality of the person, still can only lift up the personal relationship of the infertile couple-its strength and balance-as the final criterion for the acceptance of artificial insemination by donor.
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The value of corporeality is ambiguous if the level of its practical authority is undefined. If the "prophetic" message of today's Church is to be that sexual expression should arise from personal commitment which, barring extraordinary circumstances, is open to and responsible for children, it will have to find a language to ground the meanings of sex and parenthood convincingly in the personal devotion of partners. Certainly the sexual-marital partnership is neither defined morally by nor fully recapitulated in any one sexual act. Hence the tie of love, sex, and procreation must be construed primarily in view of the couple's total partnership.
Feminism: The Example of Rosemary Ruether
Feminist writings about sexuality carry through an analysis of the social context which is implicit but undeveloped in most personalist thought. 133 This underdevelopment particularly marks insights about egalitarian union used to back norms generated in social settings in which women were subordinate to men, the welfare of the conjugal couple was subordinate to that of the family and social group, and sex was understood primarily in terms of its contributions to family, clan, and species. Beginning with the experience of women, feminism situates sexual experience and relationships in the context of gender roles, their socioeconomic rationale, and their oppressive effect on women's (and to a lesser extent men's) self-understanding and social opportunities. Rosemary Ruether's long-standing interest in Catholic sexual morality was given a radically new sense of direction in the aftermath of Humanae vitae. In Sexism and God-Talk she locates the unique contribution of feminism "not in its use of the criterion of experience but rather in its use of women's experience, which has been almost entirely shut out of theological reflection in the past." 134 The critique of sexism implies a vision of more equal participation of women and men in family, culture, church, and society. Feminist ethics does not have a global blueprint for the definition and content of "full humanity" for either sex; its method is more inductive, practical, and critical in relation to existing patterns of male-female relationships. The groundedness of feminist theology in personal and social experience, including sexuality, is manifest in Ruether's proposals for liturgical rituals recognizing events in women's lives which are ignored or distorted in the patriarchal sacramental tradi- 2) To place procreation appropriately in relation to the sexually expressed union remains a major task for Catholic thinkers. Traditionalists, including the magisterium, tend to so tie procreation to acts that their affirmation of procreation is premised on what amounts to a denigration of the relationships in which it takes place. Consequently, the Catholic "message" that sex, love, and procreation are not only somehow bound together, but that parenthood is attractive and worthwhile, is lost in unedifying boundary-marking around "licit" and "illicit" variations on the sex act itself. Revisionists, reveling in the liberating if commonsensical realization that the essence of sexual morality is love, react so strongly against a legalistic casuistry of procreative sexual acts that the shared project and fulfilment of parenthood becomes a negligible byway on the moral landscape of sexual meaning. Resolution of these differences awaits an integrated approach which sees both sexual expression and procreation as crucial but derivative and hence secondary dimensions of a committed (and equal) male-female partnership.
3) Personalism in sexual ethics coincides with the modern turn to the perspective of the acting subject. It also reflects a more general phenomenological turn in natural-law thinking. Hence personalism implies the question of the evaluation of the subject's "experience," which is always partial and socially conditioned. Thus it also implies the interdependence in ethics of experience, social science, philosophy, Scripture, and Christian tradition.
4) The category "experience" becomes more inclusive as the voices of persons outside the monogamous, permanent, procreative, heterosexual union are heard. The situations they report further the insight yielded by the contraception debate, i.e. that human realities do not always conform to a general ideal, however admirable, and that morally right choices will often depend on prudent, practical adaptation of the ideal to the reality.
